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CHAPTER 10
Legal Risk Exposure in
Islamic Finance
Andrew White and
Chen Mee King1
1. INTRODUCTION
In the post-crisis environment of the past few years (since 2007–2008), risk
avoidance and the management of risk have both become an increasingly
prominent feature of the finance landscape. Financial institutions and reg-
ulators are today much more sensitive to the various potential areas of risk
and, especially, risk contagion. At broader industry levels, this has led to new
accounting standards and requirements for capital adequacy, liquidity, and
leverage. Within individual financial institutions, better risk analysis
and management mechanisms are being implemented, and even structural
changes are occurring as many financial institutions recognise the need for
risk management to move from a “back office” function often loosely
parked within the credit unit, to a “middle office” function with a unified
and more clearly defined enterprise-wide responsibility for not only credit
risk but also operational risk, liquidity risk, market risk, legal risk, and
myriad other risk exposures.
Islamic financial institutions, especially when structured and conducting
business as an analogue to conventional financial institutions, face the same
threshold risk/return concerns as conventional financial institutions. But as
Islamic financial institutions, they also have additional unique risk concerns
arising from ensuring their operations (including risk management
mechanisms), investments, and products are Shari’ah-compliant (or even,
optimally, Shari’ah-based). Many of these include Shari’ah risk (i.e., risk of
non-compliance), generally, and more particularly, fiduciary risk and
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displaced commercial risk arising from exposure to possible rate of return
disparities from higher prevailing market rates. Further, even within each
conventional risk category, Islamic financial institutions face unique risks
arising from the nature of Shari’ah-compliant operations and products.
Credit risk for an Islamic bank, for example, is complicated by, among other
concerns, Shari’ah principles that limit the remedies available to an Islamic
bank in the event of (especially non-willful) default, insolvency, and other
scenarios in which a counterparty fails to perform its obligations. Similarly,
another significant risk area for Islamic banks, liquidity risk, is exacerbated
substantially by prominent fiqh rulings circumscribing the use of asset
securitisation by Islamic banks and, at least for the present and the
immediate future, difficulties in raising funds quickly from existing money
markets or LOLR (lender of last resort) facilities typically available to
conventional banks unfettered by prohibition of riba.
2. DEFINING LEGAL RISK
Legal risk also is considerably more complicated in the context of Islamic
finance than in the conventional finance space. In broad terms, this is partly
because of the absence of mature legal frameworks and relatively untested
legal documentation governing this still-nascent industry, and partly because
of continuing uncertainty about Shari’ah and secular legal principles to be
applied in construing and enforcing Islamic legal documents. While legal
risk for Islamic financial institutions arises in the same context of credit risk,
operational risk, market risk, and other risks that confront conventional
financial institutions, Islamic financial institutions also face risk exposures
arising from secular laws and legal-political systems that do not support (or
may even be hostile to) the Shari’ah and fiqh principles2 that govern Islamic
finance; the absence of standardised legal documentation across the industry
and limitations on the terms that can be included in contracts; and the
absence of meaningful dispute resolution frameworks in most jurisdictions
in which Islamic finance is growing.
Stated in its simplest terms, the legal risk to which a party to a trans-
action is exposed is the risk that either the transaction will not be enforceable
against a counterparty, or that any of the transaction’s terms will not be
construed in accordance with the intentions of that party to the transaction.
The party exposed to legal risk may be, for example, a financial institution
or an investor in a sukuk securitisation. As with other risk exposures, legal
risk does not stand alone in a financial institution’s risk avoidance and
mitigation framework. Most prominently, it is co-related to credit risk
and market risk, for example, in that legal risk generally does not arise until
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a counterparty has either defaulted in payments or has lost a significant
amount of money invested in a transaction. That is, once either the financial
institution or the counterparty has incurred a significant loss, the next step
taken by the parties is almost invariably to analyse their respective legal
rights and obligations, in the context of applicable laws (including the
Shari’ah) and regulations, as well as the contract documents, and in turn, to
seek redress in an appropriate forum.
3. GREATER RISK FROM UNCERTAIN AND UNDEVELOPED
LAW AND REGULATION
All financial institutions encounter legal risk exposure in the face of appli-
cable laws and regulations. There may be uncertainty or dispute as to which
law governs a cross-border transaction, for example, especially if the parties
have failed to clearly state a choice of law (such as, most commonly in
finance, New York law or English law). In addition, the governing law of the
transaction may simply not support the legal position taken by the financial
institution. Moreover, there may have been a failure of compliance with
applicable regulations governing the transaction or, even more broadly, the
institution.
In the context of Islamic finance, more risk exposure is introduced by
application of the Shari’ah as an additional governing law, either explicitly
stated in the contract or implied from Shari’ah compliance as a condition of
all Islamic finance transactions. The Shari’ah, of course, is not a national law
and its inclusion in a contract’s governing law provision risks nonenforce-
ment by a secular court, especially, either as amatter of international law such
as the Rome Convention,3 or as a matter of national public policy con-
siderations that disfavor religious law, particularly in a commercial context.4
The Shari’ah and fiqh principles are difficult to deduce, and despite centuries
of intellectual struggle by even the most brilliant mujtahidun and fuqaha’,
they remain subject to variations in interpretations and differing expert
opinions across the various madhahib and among prominent Shari’ah
scholars, particularly when applied to modern finance. Finally, the body of
finance law that applies to Islamic finance remains relatively immature, as
compared to both common law and civil code jurisprudence that has devel-
oped somewhat unimpeded over the past 500 years or more. Modern Islamic
finance generally got its start in the mid-twentieth century, and virtually all
Islamic finance institutions and products in the market today have been
created only in the past 30–40 years.5 Hence, there is a dearth of common law
precedent and civil code jurisprudence that directly relates to Islamic finance
as compared to conventional finance.6 Moreover, most contemporary
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banking and finance regulations governing Islamic finance have only been
promulgated since the mid-1970s to mid-1980s in Islamic-majority countries,
and just in the past decade in most other countries. This lack of a clear and
certain body of both Islamic jurisprudence and secular law as it applies to
Islamic finance raises considerable and unique legal risk exposures for Islamic
finance institutions.
4. GREATER RISK FROM POOR DOCUMENTATION
Adding to the legal risks discussed earlier, further legal risk exposure arises
in the context of legal documentation. Islamic finance currently does not
enjoy the comfort of relying upon standardised document templates for even
the most commonly occurring transactions. Instead, most Islamic finance
transactions incur added risk exposure as a consequence of frequently
“reinventing the wheel” when negotiating and drafting different sets of
documents across different transactions or different aspects of the same
transaction. This increases the likelihood that “ordinary” errors can occur,
such as all-too-frequent slip-ups in drafting and execution resulting from cut-
and-pasting of inapplicable contract provisions, inappropriate signatories
indicated, or failure to properly sign, witness, and date documents. In
addition, substantive errors that may occur in the context of conventional
finance, such as failure to adequately anticipate events of default and to
correlate remedies in the documents, create risk in Islamic finance, as well.
Distinct from conventional finance, moreover, Islamic finance docu-
mentation is further complicated by contractual formalities required for
Shari’ah compliance and the consequent legal risk of Shari’ah non-
compliance. Significant and unique legal risk exposure is created by fiqh
rules governing capacity of the parties and, specific to the applicable
madhhab, rules governing timing and other formalities in sequencing, exe-
cution, and witnessing of documents in a given transaction. Drafting Islamic
finance documents also requires care be taken to avoid certain terminology
which otherwise is common to conventional finance,7 as well as requiring
greater clarity and specificity in key contract terms to mitigate gharar.
Moreover, there are fiqh limitations that must be considered in drafting
contract terms providing an Islamic financial institution with remedies in the
event a counterparty fails to render a payment or delivery as required by the
contract, delineating claims in insolvency proceedings, and circumscribing
Shari’ah-compliant restructuring of finance facilities. In addition, careful
attention needs to be paid when drafting contract terms that require up-front
payment of fees by the counterparty in a murabahah transaction8; when
drafting band al-jazza penalty clauses in istisna’a contracts; drafting rebate
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clauses in the event of early settlement by the counterparty9; and in drafting
arbitration or other dispute resolution clauses in the contract.
Indeed, the very structuring of Islamic finance transactions is compli-
cated by anticipation of legal risk exposure and attempts to incorporate
corresponding risk mitigation techniques in the documentation. These
include multiple-step or even parallel contracts in murabahah structures, as
well as agency agreements appointing the finance institution or counterparty,
respectively, as an agent for the other party in basic murabahah structures,
as well as tawarruq and other commodity murabahah structures.10 And in
anticipation of a Shari’ah–non-compliance defense later by a counterparty
in an attempt to avoid liability or enforcement of contract terms, Islamic
financial institutions may seek to mitigate legal risk exposure by including
in the transaction documentation a confirmation by the counterparty that it
has independently made its own assessment that the transaction is fully
Shari’ah compliant.11
5. GREATER RISK FROM UNPREDICTABLE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCESSES
The above-described legal risk exposures for Islamic financial institutions
are often characterised as falling within the following categories:
(a) “product risk,” arising when a financial institution introduces a new
product or changes an existing product; (b) “counterparty risk,” such as
when a counterparty lacks requisite capacity or authority to enter into a
particular transaction; and, most commonly, (c) “transaction risk,” arising
from negotiations and drafting of documents that either fail to comply with
legal/regulatory requirements, fail to accurately reflect the parties’ inten-
tions, contain unenforceable terms and conditions (including those that are
Shari’ah–non-compliant), or simply contain drafting errors.
Islamic finance institutions also face a further significant category of
legal risk, however, often characterised as “process risk.” This risk category
arises in the context of litigation or other legal processes to resolve legal
disputes. Internally, it includes risk exposure that arises from insufficient
record-keeping and other information processes within a financial institu-
tion. Externally, it arises from the legal processes that are utilised in resolving
disputes, such as litigation, arbitration, and other formal and informal dis-
pute resolution frameworks.
In the case of Islamic finance, dispute resolution especially presents
unique risk concerns, as well as unique opportunities. All Islamic finance
market participants, whether financial institutions or counterparties trans-
acting with them, seek stability and reliability and avoid volatility and risk.
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Essential to this is a reliable, predictable, just, fair system of dispute reso-
lution, and preferably one that has clear authority and legitimacy in the
context of Islam. Some Islamic scholars have gone so far as to suggest that
any dispute resolution based upon reference to secular fora or secular law is
in violation of the Shari’ah. Furthermore, a significant risk concern is that a
secular forum will not enforce all the provisions of Islamic finance contracts,
particularly provisions making reference to the Shari’ah, or that they will not
render judicial determinations consistent with the letter, and especially the
more nuanced spirit, of the Shari’ah.
Dispute resolution in the context of Islamic finance is distinguished from
conventional finance by an overlay of Shari’ah and fiqh principles, requiring
the intermediary12 in the dispute to have a thorough knowledge of the
Shari’ah and doctrines of the various madhahib governing a particular
Islamic finance transaction. When confronted with complex Islamic finance
products and structures, therefore, it is not sufficient that the courts simply
understand basic concepts of conventional finance, their ostensibly analo-
gous counterparts in Islamic finance, and the secular commercial law of the
given jurisdiction. Indeed, even the fundamental principles of Islamic law
may be quite elusive to conventional legal scholars and jurists lacking in-
depth education and experience in the subject. Contemporary Islamic
finance transactions significantly transcend a simple set of clearly defined
rules based on what is halal and what is haram, and even in-house Shari’ah
advisors charged with determining the permissibility of certain financial
products and structures often find themselves in a quandary. The difficulty
in fully understanding Islamic law and finance, and applying or incorpo-
rating the concepts, principles and rules correctly into transactions and
documentation entered into by financial institutions, significantly increases
the legal risk exposure for an Islamic finance institution.
In addition, parties to an Islamic finance transaction may also encounter
difficulty in persuading a court to enforce fully the terms of the transaction,
or to interpret them in full accordance with the Shari’ah, especially if there is
conflict with the relevant and controlling law of the state. Including a clear
choice of the Shari’ah as governing law in the transaction documents may
still be wise from a practical perspective as well as in meeting the religious
interests of the parties. Particularly in a secular (non-Shari’ah-incorporated)
jurisdiction, however, secular courts may refuse to enforce a Shari’ah choice
of law, on grounds of public policy or established private international law
(conflict of laws) principles. As discussed above, private international
law rules generally permit only one legal system to govern a contract, and
then only the law of a country and not non-state or religious law. In the case
of Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd & Ors v Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC,13 for
example, an English court refused to enforce the contract’s governing law
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provision asserting that the contract be “[s]ubject to the Glorious Sharia’a,”
instead deferring to the laws of England. Significantly, the Beximco court
also noted “considerable controversy and difficulty” in translating tradi-
tional fiqh into propositions of modern law, as well as the “existence of a
variety of schools of thought with which the court may have to concern
itself” before a case applying the Shari’ah can be decided. As underscored by
Beximco, in fact, before the parties are even able to address the merits of
their respective positions in a legal dispute, the parties are also faced with the
difficult task of assisting the court in understanding the complexities of
the Shari’ah, applicable fiqh, and industry practices and standards applica-
ble in a given Islamic finance transaction.
An important mitigant to the legal risk inherent in Islamic finance dis-
pute resolution is the rapidly growing use of arbitration and other forms of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in Islamic finance.14 Bypassing espe-
cially the secular courts in favor of ADR provides desperately needed subject
matter expertise in Islamic finance dispute resolution.15 In addition, an ADR
intermediary is generally not constrained by private international law prin-
ciples, such as those discussed above in the context of Beximco, limiting the
parties’ ability to choose the Shari’ah as governing law in their transaction.
Instead, an ADR intermediary should in most jurisdictions be free to decide
disputes in accordance with any principles as the parties agree, including
legal principles other than national law, such as the Shari’ah.16 Moreover,
particularly if there is a concern about the recognition of foreign judgments
across borders, especially judgments based upon Shari’ah principles, arbi-
tration is likely to afford the parties broad enforceability under the New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, to which 146 countries are currently signatories.17
In choosing an ADR forum and intermediary for Islamic finance dis-
putes, a cautionary note should be expressed with respect to the ADR
provision drafted by the parties, in order to ameliorate rather than exacer-
bate process risk exposure. It is common practice for most lawyers to simply
include in Islamic finance documents a standard ADR clause, mirroring the
clauses used in conventional transactions. These clauses usually provide for
arbitration and/or mediation in accordance with applicable statutory law, if
any, and further incorporate by reference a particular ADR institution’s
rules or other procedural framework. As the Islamic finance industry con-
tinues to grow and mature, and as rapidly increasing numbers of defaults
have been arising in the context of Islamic finance, dispute resolution clauses
and agreements need to be more of a forethought than an afterthought.
Greater innovation in drafting ADR clauses is needed, carefully setting
forth the agreed upon qualifications and expertise of the ADR intermediary,
for example, as well as the particular madhhab and specific principles of
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fiqh al-mu’amalat, and any industry standards promulgated by the
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions
(AAOIFI), the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), and other interna-
tional standard setting bodies.18
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is ironic that the very foundation that makes Islamic finance a potentially
thriving industry—the Shari’ah and its role in suggesting antidotes to many
of the underlying ills of conventional finance—is also the unique factor that
increases legal risk exposure in modern Islamic finance as compared with
conventional finance. While the industry demands that products and
operations of Islamic financial institutions be fully Shari’ah-compliant, most
jurisdictions’ surrounding legal frameworks of laws, regulations, and courts
generally do not support application of the Shari’ah in Islamic finance
transaction and, in some cases, may be hostile toward the application of
Shari’ah. Indeed, Islamic finance finds itself in a most peculiar and unique
position of relying upon a body of finance law that is rigorously applied
from inception to the conclusion of a given transaction in terms of concepts,
principles, and rules (always under the watchful eyes of a Shari’ah Super-
visory Board), yet it is seldom specified or enforced as the governing law for
the construction, interpretation and dispute resolution regarding the given
transaction and documentation.
Indeed, while the Shari’ah is the one necessary component in all aspects
of Islamic finance, it becomes an unwelcome guest after the product has been
structured and, in fact, becomes a potential liability from the perspective of
legal risk exposure. It appears that much more legal risk exposure is incurred
in an Islamic finance transaction, as the transaction and documentation
surrounding it are carefully structured to comply with a particular body of
law (the Shari’ah), but with the further reality that yet a different or addi-
tional (secular) law will govern the transaction instead. In short, instead of
effectively mitigating the legal risks of the financial institution in relation to
the transaction, the financial institution’s legal risks have, on the contrary,
increased.
It is suggested in this chapter that the solution to this ironic disconnect
between the intentions of the Islamic finance industry to find a path which is
less risky for all participants than conventional finance, and the reality of
Shari’ah compliance actually causing more problems than it avoids, lies
simply with much greater education and awareness of the basic principles
of Islamic finance on the part of all the industry players. It is the lack of
understanding and experience that results in faulty structuring of Islamic
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finance transactions, the usage of inappropriate terminology, charging of
rates or upfront fees that are not Shari’ah-compliant, or documentation that
is actually inconsistent with the very Islamic concepts upon which the
transaction is based.19 While it may involve considerable time, effort and
costs, which financial institutions, regulators and other industry players
generally may not be willing yet to expend at this still-early stage of devel-
opment, it is imperative that much more thought and effort be invested in
knowledge development as the first step towards having the meaningful legal
risk management process that is proving to be essential for Islamic finance.20
With deeper knowledge and greater understanding of Islamic finance
and the Shari’ah and fiqh principles upon which it is based, comes better and
more innovative structuring, clearer and tighter documentation, more reli-
able dispute resolution, and a stronger framework of enabling laws and
regulations needed for better legal risk mitigation and avoidance.
NOTES
1. Professor Andrew White is the Director of the International Islamic Law &
Finance Centre and Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management
University. Mrs. Chen Mee King is Senior Vice President, Head of Legal and
Corporate Secretariat, Legal and Shari’ah Group, The Islamic Bank of Asia
Limited (Singapore & Bahrain); Mrs. Chen is also an Adjunct Associate
Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. The views expressed in
this chapter do not necessarily express the views of either the SMU or The
Islamic Bank of Asia Limited.
2. While much of the contemporary authoritative literature (e.g., AAOIFI Shari’ah
standards and IFSB standards) uses the terminology, “Shari’ah rules and
principles” as a comprehensive concept that refers to both the Shari’ah and ﬁqh,
subtle distinction between the two must be kept in mind. Shari’ah is a divinely
ordained path; ﬁqh is the product of rational human endeavor (hence the var-
ious madhahib of slightly differentiated ﬁqh), practical rules derived through a
combination of interpretation and ijtihad from detailed evidence in the sources
of the Shari’ah (a process generally regulated by usul al-ﬁqh). And while the
Shari’ah broadly governs the Islamic ﬁnance industry, it is ﬁqh that is criticised
and debated in determining points of agreement, as well as disagreement across
madhahib, as to the validity of structures and contract terms.
3. In the EU, for example, the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations 1980, known as the Rome Convention, mandates that contracts be
governed by only the legal system of a country. This principle was emphasised in
the context of Islamic ﬁnance in the English case of Beximco Pharmaceuticals
Ltd & Ors v Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC [2004] EWCA Civ 19 (28 January
2004), in the Supreme Court of Judicature, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), on
appeal from the High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division (Morison J).
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4. Indeed, a “pretty good way to generate an outcry, as the Archbishop of
Canterbury learned in Britain recently, is to say that a Western legal system
should make room for Shariah, or Islamic law.” Adam Liptak, “When God and
the Law Don’t Square” The New York Times (17 February 2008), www.nytimes
.com/2008/02/17/weekinreview/17liptak.html?pagewanted=print.
5. It should be noted that modern Islamic ﬁnance products generally are based
upon nominate contract schemes and partnership principles that date back to
(and even pre-date in some cases) the revelation of Islam, although their
development as analogues to conventional ﬁnance facilities began in the 1970s
and 1980s.
6. A recent project undertaken by students at the Singapore Management Uni-
versity, for example, identiﬁed fewer than two dozen reported Islamic ﬁnance
cases across all common law jurisdictions, as at March 2012.
7. It is surprising that conventional ﬁnance terminology such as “repayment,”
“loan,” “interest,” “guaranteed rate of return,” and indiscriminate use of “late
payment penalty” clauses, may still be found in some Term Sheets and other
Islamic ﬁnance documentation.
8. “Upfront Fees” and “Commitment Fees,” which are usually paid upfront or for
the commitment to provide a facility, would generally not be acceptable. Fees
paid should be in respect of services performed or to be performed in relation to
the transaction.
9. Rebate may be requested or may be given at the discretion of the recipient of the
early settlement or payment amount, without any rate or formulae being
speciﬁed or referenced.
10. Although such provisions are not sure or conclusive ways to handle the risks, it
is not unusual to ﬁnd included in the transaction documentation various pro-
visions imposing upon the counterparty, as agent for the ﬁnancial institution, an
obligation to ensure that the assets purchased by it are as required by speciﬁ-
cations; this may be helpful later to the ﬁnancial institution if necessary to claim
a defense or even a counterclaim against the counterparty, in the event the
counterparty (as purchaser) brings a claim against the ﬁnancial institution for
breach of warranty.
11. This may help avoid precisely the problems encountered in The Investment Dar
Company KSCC v. Blom Developments Bank SAL [2009] EWHC 3545 (Ch).
12. Typically, this is a secular trial judge, or—if an alternative form of dispute
resolution is agreed upon by the parties—a designated arbitrator or a mediator,
often acting administratively within the framework of a formal dispute-
resolution institution.
13. See note 3, supra, Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd & Ors v Shamil Bank of
Bahrain EC [2004] EWCA Civ 19 (28 January 2004), in the Supreme Court
of Judicature, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), on appeal from the High Court
of Justice Queen’s Bench Division (Morison J).
14. In the context of Islamic ﬁnance dispute resolution, it has been suggested that
the conventional term, ADR, be replaced with a more appropriate term, IDR,
encompassing a form of Islamic dispute resolution that incorporates both
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substantive and procedural approaches to dispute resolution inherent in Islamic
legal tradition. This innovative concept is discussed at length in Andrew White,
“Dispute Resolution and Specialized ADR for Islamic Finance,” Chapter 12,
Islamic Finance: Law and Practice, edited by Craig R. Nethercott and David M.
Eisenberg (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012).
15. At the same time, ADR for Islamic ﬁnance can also accommodate Islamic legal
values and traditions, resurrecting the traditional Islamic concept of dispute
settlement (sulh), and subsuming notions of non-binding mediation (wasata)
and binding arbitration (tahkim) into a single ADR process. (Source: see
note 14).
16. Not long after the decision in Beximco, the English High Court of Justice
(Chancery Division) held that the Shari’ah may be applied to the subject matter
and resolution of a dispute in arbitration, where the parties have so chosen in
the contract itself. In Musawi v RE International (UK) Ltd & Ors, [2007]
EWHC 2981 (Ch) (14 December 2007), the court held that although only
English law could govern the interpretation of the agreement itself, resolution of
the actual dispute between the parties was to be in accordance with the Shari’ah.
17. See www.newyorkconvention.org/new-york-convention-countries as of 26
February 2012.
18. This is discussed in greater detail, and a suggested IDR clause is provided, in
Andrew White, “Dispute Resolution and Specialized ADR for Islamic Finance,”
supra note 14.
19. A good example is the use of clauses that effectively promise ﬁxed returns in a
transaction based on wakala, such as apparently occurred in the TID v Blom
transaction, supra note 11.
20. Fortunately, the shortage of experts with education, training, and experience in
the Shari’ah, applicable secular commercial law, and Islamic ﬁnance is currently
being addressed in the interest of increasing overall “human capital” available
to the Islamic ﬁnance industry. The absence of facilitative legal and institutional
frameworks, however, remains largely unaddressed, even in countries with
signiﬁcant Muslim populations.
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